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How do political administrations sustain whatever kinds of cohesion they do, over their time in 
office? Although recent research emphasises institutions, sometimes institutions also weaken 
cohesion. Informal institutions are more important than formal ones in shaping styles of political 
judgement in governing administrations. But how can institutional processes explain both 
weakening and strengthening? This article develops a neo-Durkheimian theory. It proposes that 
informal institutions should be understood as operating through very particular kinds of practices, 
which are enacted in a limited number of basic kinds of ritual interaction order. The article 
innovates by showing how written ritual in government interacts with face-to-face ritual in 
cultivating styles both of thought and of emotions to sustain positive and negative feedback 
dynamics. The argument is illustrated by analysing negative rites of blame and accusation and 
positive rites of self-assertion during positive feedback in the individualistic interaction order in 
Harold Wilson’s 1960s cabinet. 
  3 
 
This theory development article presents a novel neo-Durkheimian institutional account of how 
informal institutional processes weaken but also sustain cohesion within political administrations, 
as they cultivate styles of political judgement. Relations between two registers of ritual interaction 
order are, it argues, critical. To illustrate (but not fully test) the argument, the article uses archival 
data to examine what some regard as a ‘hard’ case for neo-Durkheimian arguments – namely, an 
administration that was both institutionally individualistic and ideologically social democratic. The 
article addresses two linked questions. 
 First, how do political administrations sustain such cohesion as they do, over their time in 
office? Here, cohesion means social relations of whatever form, notwithstanding inevitable 
conflicts, allowing sufficient mutual reliance to sustain minimally effective collective action in 
governing. Maintaining cohesion is challenging. Throughout political history, administrations have 
lost cohesion, sometimes so seriously as to weaken their capacity to govern.  
 Second, how does cultivation of styles of political judgement by informal institutions (6, 2011, 
2014a) shape capacities for cohesion? Research has shown that selective incentives for equilibria, 
emphasised by collective action theory, are insufficient without institutions sustaining commitment 
among actors to particular ways of organising (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013). Institutions providing 
material incentives are often formal, explicit ones. Yet, when selective incentives matter, informal 
institutions make this possible, by buttressing incentives’ importance in ways that people are 
cultivated to think (Wildavsky, 1994). Although institutionalist research has shown informal 
institutions’ general connection with cognition (Lowndes and Roberts 2013; Thornton et al, 2012), 
and styles of cohesion, exchange and power (Helmke and Levitsky, 2006; Farrell and Héritier, 
2003), researchers have yet adequately to theorise precise institutional dynamics that cultivate 
particular styles of thought and judgement and how, in turn, these reinforce institutions or elicit 
countervailing processes to undermine cohesion. 
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 Neo-Durkheimian institutional theory offers dynamics for explaining trajectories in which 
contrasting types of cohesion are sustained or may be lost. Moreover, it argues that particular 
institutional processes reinforce styles of thought which help both to sustain and to undermine 
forms of cohesion. Three Durkheimian elements underpin the argument. First, following Douglas 
(1982, 1992; Gross and Rayner, 1985; Hood, 1998), Durkheim’s (1951) two dimensions of 
institutional variation – social regulation and social integration – are cross-tabulated to identify 
distinct elementary forms of cohesion. Second, Durkheim’s (1995) central argument that all social 
organisation is fundamentally ritual in its causal mechanism is extended, using Goffman’s (1967) 
and Collins’s (2004) Durkheimian concept of ritual interaction orders in quotidian exchange. 
Third, contrary to the misconception that Durkheimian theory emphasises normative consensus, 
Durkheim (1957) argued that conflict is a ritually ordered process by which institutional pressures 
clash (Alexander, 1988). Thus the power of functional explanations for conflict can be retained 
while avoiding structural-functionalism (Douglas, 1986; 6, 2014b). A neo-Durkheimian conception 
of informal institutions as sets of practices enacted in ritual is developed and recast as ritual 
interaction order. In government, these practices are conducted through written exchanges as 
much as in face-to-face meetings, and so documentary sources must be examined to understand 
how cohesion is institutionally sustained.  
 
Institutions and elementary forms  
Neo-Durkheiman arguments distinguish two levels of institutional analysis. Empirical institutions 
vary vastly over history and geography. Elementary forms (Durkheim, 1995), by contrast, represent 
generic universal imperatives of institutional organisation which furnish basic structures for 
organising and disorganising in any setting (6, 2014b). They are rarely made explicit, unless 
practitioners adopt social scientific vocabularies. 
 Durkheim (1951) distinguished two basic organising imperatives – namely, social regulation, 
or the degree to which institutions constrain by roles, imperatives and constraints; and social 
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integration, or the degree to which institutions organise around bonds or membership in bounded 
groups. Douglas (1982) cross-tabulated these dimensions to define the neo-Durkheimian 
typology’s well-known four elementary forms (Douglas, 1982; Thompson et al, 1990) – namely, 
hierarchical (strong regulation and integration, where inequality takes the form of superior and 
subaltern bound together in integrated rule-based status systems: 6, 2015a), individualistic (weak 
regulation and integration, where inequality takes the form of patrons and claques of clients only 
bound together by transactionally-driven exchange), isolate (strong regulation, weak integration, 
where inequality may be between structurally despotic figures, if any, and those in structural serf 
positions: 6, 2015b) and enclaved institutions (strong integration and weak external regulation, 
although regulation is generated voluntarily from within – Rayner, 1988 – where inequality is 
between members and non-members). In loose mixes or settlements or in conflict but in 
contrasting relative weights of which the theory enables comparative analysis, combinations of 
elementary forms will be found in most empirical settings, resulting from dynamic feedback 
processes whereby each form elicits counter-assertion from people reaching for other forms. 
Moreover, in hybrids, rhetoric cultivated by one form may be ‘borrowed’ to serve another the 
other’s institutional imperatives (Thompson et al, 1990).  
 Thus, institutions motivate, bias and shape collective capabilities including those for cohesion. 
Durkheim’s (1995) argument, though, was not simply that rites make bonds, but that they do so 
through cultivating cognition (cf. Durkheim and Mauss, 1963, 11). The neo-Durkheimian 
reformulation is that each form cultivates distinct styles of thought (Douglas, 1986) and judgement 
in political decisionmaking (6, 2011, 2014a). Styles describe the manner in which people think, 
irrespective of the content of their normative beliefs. They are exhibited in emotions cultivated, in 
stances adopted toward risk, toward past and future, consistency, structuring and linkage among 
categories such as fallback options considered in decisions, and other discourse which frame and 
bias decisionmaking (6, 2011). Styles are only as cognitively regulated and integrated as policy-
makers are socially regulated and integrated (6, 2014a). For example, individualistic institutional 
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forms cultivate ways of coming to deals locally (within the cabinet, perhaps) and then of painting 
onto the wider world a deal-making style for resolving difficulties (with interest groups, for 
example). As forms are ritually reinforced, thought styles lead people to reproduce their 
institutional practices. 
 Conventional understandings of institutions yield weak explanations for of how cohesion and 
associated thought styles are sustained. Some traditions simply regard institutions as regularities 
sustained for as long as the balance of costs, risks and payoffs permit (Calvert, 1998). Yet this fails 
to account for their entrenchment, exteriority (Zucker, 1977) imperative authority (Levitsky, 1998) 
or their clustering in particular elementary forms. Many traditions define institutions as rules (e.g., 
North, 1990, 2; Ostrom, 1990, 23; March and Olsen, 1989, 22). But a rule is a statement, either 
accepted or rejected, that in specified conditions, categories of people may, must or may not 
perform particular actions. If we were to ascribe (presumably unconscious) beliefs about rules, or 
even well-formed concepts about their precise content, to everyone within a tacit institution, this 
would lead to an implausibly intellectualist picture of human thought and action (Garfinkel, 1967). 
People may have few, vague or even inaccurate beliefs about their practices. Moreover, they may 
be able, at least initially, tacitly to coordinate practices without sharing statements of rules. Often 
only when practices are settled do categories for describing them stabilise, and people share 
understanding of their use. Conventions for writing cabinet minutes, practices of address in 
parliament or cabinet, standards of civil service drafting, even professional ethics were all 
established informal practices with expectations and sanctions long before being codified, whether 
in response to challenge or anomaly. Prior general ideas do not necessarily explain specific ones. 
Formal statements such as rules, are often ex post facto rationalisations of things done for other 
causes. Although in some empirical institutions (e.g., legal practice or science at their best) we may 
use a commitment to a general idea or rule to prescribe action in a particular case, we more often 
invoke general ideas in justification, exculpation or sense-making after the fact. 
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Practices 
Neo-Durkheimian institutional theory solves these difficulties by defining institutions, in their 
elementary forms, as structures of ritually ordered and stylised practices (6, 2007; 2011). But what 
are practices? Practice theorists distinguish between 
- sets of skills in empirical fields (Bourdieu, 1990), such as Inuit practices of sailing a canoe 
or Lakeland herdwick sheep farming (cf. Shove et al, 2012) or Rhodes’ (2011) ‘politeness’ 
and ‘gossip’ which characterise life across the senior civil service; and  
- micro-level practices which are configured differently in particular empirical fields: these 
are sometimes called generic or dispersed practices (Schatzki, 1996, 91).  
 The present argument concerns a subset of generic practices – called operations – undertaken 
differently in each elementary form. It focuses particularly on those concerned with accusing and 
blaming, deference and bargaining. 
 Unlike skills in empirical fields, operations do not carry readily specifiable rule-like conditions 
for successful performance. Contrasting styles of using blame, accusation or deference are 
cultivated in governments, but more powerful machinery than rule sets is required to understand 
how styles sustain different kinds of cohesion and manners of thought.  
 Operations are defined, therefore, by their illocutionary forces (Austin, 1962; Searle 1969). By 
contrast with speech act theory, the neo-Durkheimian argument is that actors reconstruct 
meanings of performances with varying biases cultivated by the mix of elementary forms. 
 Operational practices are, therefore, (a) common, repeated illocutionary forces (Austin, 1962; 
Searle, 1969) (b) undertaken through types of physical actions or categories of sentences, (c) 
typically described in verb-phrases, (d) sufficiently entrenched and recognised to be 
institutionalised, (e) ritually enacted (f) and enacted differently, by prevailing degrees of social 
regulation and integration in specific informal institutions. 
 Operational practices are neither habits nor routines. Neither habits nor routines need have 
particular illocutionary force. Unlike routines, operational practices are not necessarily staged 
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procedures: they can be enacted quite differently under different institutions or conventions. 
Unlike habits they are rarely undertaken for their own sake. Moreover, operational practices need 
not be only about social order. Indeed, practices of blaming and accusing are stylised practices 
which can give rise to disorder (cf. Durkheim, 1995; Turner 1995). Organisational norms may 
specify when, where and why particular operational practices may or may not acceptably be 
deployed but operations are not themselves norms. Indeed, conflicting norms disagree precisely 
about which practices are acceptable in which circumstances. Norms tend to be justified by 
reference to substantive worldviews or ideologies but the focus of the present argument is on 
thought style in practices rather than on justifications (6, 2014a). 
 
Ritual interaction order 
Operational practices are, Durkheimian traditions argue, organised, combined, and stylised in 
ritually established behaviours that enact social organisation (Bell, 1997; 6, 2007, 41-2; 2011, 72-6). 
Blame, deference, confrontation, are conducted differently with different illocutionary forces in, 
for example, competitive individualistic orders and in enclaved settings, because ritual interaction 
order is driven by different institutionalised forms of informal relations (6, 2007). In the 
Durkheimian understanding of these practices as rites, people enact (literally, metonymically or 
imperatively) in microcosm the degree of weak or strong regulation and integration that sustains 
the practice and which enactment (if successful) reinforces.  
 Elementary forms of institutions consist in sets of stylised operational practices which ritually 
cultivate styles of thought (Douglas, 1986) and styles of feeling or emotion which sustain distinct 
forms of cohesion (6, 2003b, 2007). ‘Collective effervescence’ (Durkheim, 1995) is defined in neo-
Durkheimian theory as the style of emotion cultivated in face-to-face ritual interaction that 
cultivates and recharges thought styles peculiar to the (mix of) elementary form(s) of social 
relations, reinforces the prevailing pattern of weak or strong social integration and regulation, 
channels conflict either destructively (Durkheim cites the 1789 French revolution) or 
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constructively and which cultivates styles of moral commitment appropriate to the form’s 
imperatives (cf. Shilling and Mellor, 1998; Olaveson 2001). Defined thus, effervescence will exhibit 
different emotions in individualistic institutions from those shown in the enclaved setting which 
Durkheim (1995) examined. Emotions will be those of competitive rivalry and mutual blame, 
accusation and recrimination, anger when patrons feel betrayed, but also cooler ones of deal-
making, individual aspiration and stoic commitment of clients to patrons. Individualistic 
effervescence in administrations therefore elicits both individualised conflict and emotions that 
help channel it for individualistic cohesion. 
 Observable practices simultaneously reinforce and undermine both social regulation and social 
integration. For example, some blame practices assert social regulation upon the blamed while 
disciplining them to remain within a strongly integrated zone of organisation; others exclude, by 
marking boundaries between blamers and blamed. Practices must therefore be distinguished by 
the mix of elementary forms in which they combine and conflict, or we mistake their causal 
significance. 
 The neo-Durkheimian thesis is that each elementary form of informal quotidian practices 
governing encounters, meetings, briefings, informal conversations, emails and text messages, 
constitutes a ritual interaction order stylising sets of operational practices (Goffman, 1967; Collins, 
2004). These orders shape thought more powerfully than formal, prescribed, public ceremonial 
ritual events (Kertzer, 1988) such as parliamentary votes (Crewe, 2005) or the theatricalities of 
ministerial press conferences.  
 Among operational practices, Durkheim distinguished negative from positive rites. Negative 
rites enact prohibition or condemnation, requiring, for example, exclusion of people of prohibited 
status, or eschewing certain practices (Durkheim 1995, 303-4) by blaming, confronting or accusing, 
for example (Douglas, 1970, 1992; Hood, 2011). They matter because threats to break or violations 
relations are important dynamics within and between forms. Positive rites, on the other hand, 
enact commitment to, or respect for, or participation in actions, and the conjoining of people with 
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approved statuses (Durkheim 1995, 330). Goffman (1967) showed that the distinction between 
positive and negative rites organises everyday practices of etiquette, deference, demeanour and 
embarrassment in interaction orders into avoidance and involvement rituals. This article shows 
that these forms also organise institutional processes in policymaking. 
 Among positive rites, Goffman (1967) emphasised deference, self-respect and respect for 
other individuals as persons. In total institutions such as asylums, he documented their attenuation 
among powerful and powerless people alike. But total institutions need not be so tyrannical. The 
intensity of ministerial life and the relentless hours of senior civil servants – recently re-emphasised 
by Rhodes (2011) – make the Westminster ‘village’ almost a total institution; only in the criterion 
of residence does the policymaking community fail Goffman’s (1961) definition of an enclosed, 
tightly administered workplace cut off from ordinary life. But, despite dressings-down in whips’ 
offices, and the abuse during Prime Minister’s Questions, a positive cult of the individual is 
sustained by rites in many settings across Westminster and Whitehall. Figure 1 displays the 
structure of relationships between operational and empirical practices in positive and negative rites. 
[Figure 1] 
 In hybrids, people may use vocabularies and categories drawn from one form’s thought style, 
which is less strongly articulated in the mix. Such ‘borrowed rhetoric’ between elementary forms 
is significant, where the dominant form shapes uses to which practices are put more heavily than 
the one from which discourse is borrowed. In other cases, practices may be similar between forms, 
but not actually borrowed. For example, there may be active suppression of anomalies in isolate 
despotic cases and in enclaved forms: careful longitudinal analysis of dynamics is required to 
distinguish them (6, 2015b). 
 When they work successfully, rites of signing contracts, swearing oaths, taking vows and voting 
fix categories of duty and commitment among buyers and sellers, spouses, or electors and 
politicians (Durkheim 1957; 1995). Moreover, institutions not only fix particular categories, but 
establish strong or weak consistency within thought styles (Douglas, 1986). The same mechanisms 
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operate in weakly integrated forms (Goffman, 1959), as in the strongly integrated cases that 
Durkheim studied. Styles are ritually cultivated in the interaction order of daily business in meetings 
(Schwartzman, 1989; Peck et al, 2004), for example, among ministers and civil servants (6, 2011), 
as much as in acquaintances’ casual conversations (Goffman, 1967). 
 Sometimes we can trace emergence or reinforcement of ways of using categories through 
negative and positive ritual practices over a set of conversations and meetings (6, 2011). The most 
significant categories thus fixed exhibit, in transposed form, the same degree of integration, 
internally and with other categories, as people performing the practices are informally 
institutionally integrated and regulated. Most work on quotidian ritual interaction orders examines 
how face-to-face settings generate emotional energy (Goffman, 1967; Collins, 2004). However, 
executive government is a setting in which much communication is done in writing (Heclo and 
Wildavsky, 1981). Memoranda, personal minutes, minutes of meetings, briefing notes, and 
speaking notes have long been recognised as genres of bureaucratic writing in Whitehall’s domestic 
departments and the diplomatic service possesses its own baroque menu of communication 
genres. In the 1960s, a finely-honed sensibility was cultivated by which civil servants recognised 
polish and panache in drafting; a reputation for drafting a well-turned minute counted heavily for 
promotion. In the age of emails and social media, elegance may have given way to urgency (Rhodes, 
2011). Yet the interaction order in the executive is still conducted and enacted in writing as much 
as in meetings. Face-to-face work still rests on prior exchange of written papers and results in 
minuted decisions. These documents are not merely records but interventions in a conversation, 
with their own rhetorical forms and, the case study will show, their own styles for engendering 
emotion, changing social relations and behavioural responses within institutional orderings. Few 
studies of organisations address ritual interaction orders displayed in such documents (Romm 
(Livermore) 1999 is a partial exception, but does not ground the argument in ritual forms). 
Perusing official files in The National Archives (TNA) (which are rich in informal notes which 
would today be emailed, as well as formal minutes) quickly demonstrates that face-to-face 
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communication has no monopoly on stirring and defusing emotion, building and demolishing 
status, or making and breaking solidarities. Drafting subtleties sustain analogous means of making 
bonds and fixing categories to those of deportment, gesture, facial expression and intonation in 
face-to-face communication. Nor is there endless innovation in written bureaucratic exchange: it 
is typically as ritually formulaic as politicians’ conflicts in the House of Commons. The ritual 
interaction order of Whitehall’s written communications contains and channels emotions, 
providing means both for their exacerbation and their calming. 
 The neo-Durkheimian argument predicts that written and face-to-face ritual interaction orders 
will show consistency in styles, dynamically reinforcing each other. This dynamic of mutual 
reinforcement during positive feedback is explored in the case study, where genres had been 
developed against the grain of the civil service’s written ritual interaction order, reflecting the 
administration’s competitive, accusatory, blame-ridden face-to-face ritual interaction order. 
Conversely, oral speech genres influenced the ritual style of written communication. Figure 2 
shows the structure of expected cross-influence. 
[Figure 2] 
 As rites, practices are repeated (Bell, 1997; Rothenbuhler, 1998). Repetition typically yields, not 
exact copies, but self-reinforcement, and more exaggerated radical forms (positive feedback), or 
else countervailing pressure (negative feedback) generating tension among practices or else 
accommodations or hybridity among elementary forms (6, 2003a). In either trajectory, the series of 
performances fixes categories: ritual repetition provides micro-foundations for feedback dynamics. 
Contrary to theories which assume positive feedback to be a stabilising force (Arthur 1994; Pierson 
2004), the neo-Durkheimian argument is that amplification ultimately disorganises practices 
(Durkheim, 1951; 1984, Bk III) by throwing up disorganising anomalies, tensions or conflicts 
which, in turn, lead actors to react against the exaggerated disorganising form. The result is negative 
feedback or countervailing reaction among forms. Ritual operational practices of accusation, blame 
and reproof are causally central in negative feedback, because they initiate sanctioning practices 
  13 
(Douglas, 1970; 1999). However, people can react against one elementary form only by reaching 
for others (Thompson et al, 1990). Unlike early cybernetic theory (Deutsch, 1963), feedback in 
neo-Durkheimian institutional dynamics produces, not information, but institutional pressure 
(Durkheim 1982). (Negative and positive rites do not map directly onto negative and positive 
feedback, because negative rites, at least, cross-tabulate positive and negative feedback. Discipline 
within and conflict among elementary forms are both conducted by negative rites.) 
 Causal process tracing (Bennett and Checkel, 2015) can examine qualitative data for evidence 
of theoretically expected mechanisms to explain the development and amplification of practices 
in face-to-face and written ritual interaction orders and their effects upon thought styles and 
collective capabilities for cohesion in administrations.  
 To develop and illustrate the argument, this article examines relations among negative and 
positive rites in face-to-face and written ritual interaction orders in an individualistically ordered 
governing executive undergoing positive feedback to a degree which appeared to threaten its 
cohesion, but where individualistic institutions also then sustained recovery in cohesion. An 
individualistically ordered administration is chosen because sceptics would regard its dynamic as 
furnishing a ‘hard case’ for an institutional theory to explain. Analysis shows that dynamics in ritual 
interaction orders within an administration are highly consequential, even in a case where readers 
might not expect it to be, if they suppose that ritual is mainly a feature of hierarchical settings. The 
study shows that individualistic behaviour requires sustained collective institutional capability to 
stylise its peculiar negative and positive rites in ways that sustained and recovered cohesion while 
also enabling competition and conflict. It therefore helps to understand how channelling and 
containment of conflict and competition within individualistic ordering can actually sustain 
capacities for cohesion, even when initial appearances suggest a risk of breakdown. In the UK, by 
no means all administrations are individualistically ordered: for example, the Attlee administration 
was fairly strongly hierarchically ordered (6, in press). Dynamics and relations among individualistic 
ritual interaction orders examined here are not specific to British government. They arise in any 
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governing executive, in cabinet systems or among presidential advisers. In the US, for example, 
Kennedy’s advisers were individualistically ordered (6, 2011) but Eisenhower’s were not (Haney, 
1997; Bowie, 2001). Formal constitutional rules, civil service practices, conventions and codes (e.g., 
those in ‘Questions of procedure for ministers’: Baker, 2000) ensure that hierarchy is always articulated 
to some degree in any administration. However, against this enduring backdrop of hierarchical 
formal institutions, the two 1960s Labour administrations under Prime Minister Harold Wilson 
were heavily individualistic in informal institutions which ordered ministers’ relations with each 
other and which stylised their political judgement (6, 2015b: contra Bale, 1999). Leading ministers 
engaged in intense competitive rivalries. Wilson himself was the most powerful patron, though 
constantly threatened by his ‘crown princes’ and their claques of clients. Indeed, individualistic 
ordering became more marked over the life of his second (1966-1970) administration. The wider 
party and the commons backbench contained important enclaved groups on the socialist left; some 
ministers operated in peripheral zones of isolate ordering; but most ministers and their advisers 
were individualistically ordered in claques of followers around a few powerful patrons. The article 
focuses on 1968-9 when positive feedback dynamics of self-reinforcement and radicalisation in 
competitive individualistic ordering were deepening. Examining a Labour administration is also 
valuable in refuting the common misunderstanding that neo-Durkheimian arguments expect left-
leaning ideologies to be sustained only in enclaved social organisation. Because thought style 
matters independently of ideology, the case demonstrates that a social democratic worldview can 
be sustained in highly individualistic institutions, just as enclaved groups of monetarists have 
sustained that ideology with a sectarian thought style (6, 2011, 2014a, in press). The 1966-70 
Labour administration provides especially fertile illustration of practices of blame, reproof and 
admonition in both written and face-to-face ritual interaction orders and of ways in which cohesion 
was sustained in spite of, and partly through conflicts cultivated under individualistic institutions. 
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 Robust coding of variants in practices in a written ritual interaction order requires access to 
extensive documentary evidence. Analysis needs cases for which official papers are available, and 
where there are also abundant memoirs, biographies and historical research enabling robust coding 
of social organisation in government. While Freedom of Information requests can be used to 
obtain limited numbers of documents on recent cases, achieving adequate breadth depends on 
selecting cases for which evidence is available under the thirty-year rule for the release of 
documents to TNA. This article therefore draws upon an extensive comparative study of informal 
institutional ordering and political judgement in British administrations from the 1960s and early 
1970s which uses just such a very wide range of sources. The article examines written ritual 
interaction order in Wilson’s response to fracturing cabinet collective responsibility in autumn 
1968 and then face-to-face ritual interaction action order in deepening tensions in spring 1969 
among ministers over the proposed legislation to deal with unofficial strikes in ways that trades 
unions regarded as ‘punitive’ (Jenkins, 1970; Tyler, 2006). 
 Using historical cases furnishes richer data sets than interviews on contemporary ones. 
Because most of constitutional structures and political pressures faced by 1960s governments still 
dominate politics today, they are of continuing relevance.  
 Ministerial diaries and memoirs notoriously require care. Crossman’s, Benn’s and Castle’s were 
written for subsequent publication. Because little (Benn, Castle) or no (Crossman) editing was 
done, each diary presents their author in a poor light as often as they show them acting well. Some 
entries can readily be suspected of exaggeration or self-deception. Following historians’ practice, I 
therefore draw inferences about events only where diarists corroborate each other. But for present 
purposes, daily entries, often written in the heat of emotions generated by encounters described, 
also reveal the manner in which ministers used language in daily performance (6, 2015b, annexe 
for details of coding method used). 
 In the section on individualistic written interaction order, we find hierarchical rhetoric 
borrowed for purposes specified by individualistic informal ordering. In the section on face-to-
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face interaction order, some months later when self-reinforcement in competitive rivalry had 
advanced and threatened cohesion, we see hierarchy attenuated and find innovation in written 
ritual interaction order to handle deepening conflict in the face to face order. 
 The case illustrates the theoretical argument well because, despite all this, the administration 
recovered by dint of individualistic deal-making among the most powerful patrons: enough 
capability remained in its informal institutions to avoid collapse and to channel conflict 
constructively. The government only narrowly lost the subsequent election, for quite other 
reasons.  
Written ritual interaction order: blame, reproof and admonition practices 
On 21st October, 1968, Harold Wilson sent his ministers an unprecedented personal minute (CAB 
164/666. 21.10.68: citations in this format are to TNA files). Wilson, himself a constant leaker and 
off-the-record briefer, had frequently admonished his colleagues against leaking and briefing and 
for dropping unattributable hints of dissatisfaction with policy or his leadership. Reminders of 
collective cabinet responsibility were not novel. Yet nothing sent by any previous postwar premier 
shows a similar tone. 
 Wilson complained of a ‘growing desire of certain Ministers to divide themselves into two 
distinct personalities, the one Ministerial and the other constituency M.P. or philosophical 
innovator. Ministers are Ministers and should never appear schizophrenic’. Warning his colleagues 
that they could not excuse themselves by claiming to speak in personal capacities, Wilson wrote 
‘Gurus should on the whole be confined to the Wolverhampton circuit’1 and that ‘private 
enterprise philosophising’ and ‘kite-flying’ would have to be cleared with his office beforehand. 
 The minute was accompanied by an announcement that Judith Hart, the Paymaster-General, 
would be responsible for vetting speeches – a move that diarists Tony Benn (Postmaster-General) 
                                                 
1 Enoch Powell, sometimes derided as a ‘guru’, delivered his outrageous ‘rivers of blood’ speech in his Wolverhampton 
constituency earlier that year. The word ‘circuit’ may refer to that city’s group of Methodist churches which, in the 
nineteenth century, had a reputation for extravagant evangelical preachers – something Wilson’s Methodist upbringing 
would have taught him. 
  17 
and Richard Crossman (Social Services Secretary) predicted correctly that ministers would not 
accept.  
 The immediate occasion for this acid remonstration was a constituency speech by Benn 
attacking the BBC. Suspecting Benn of timing it to upstage his own planned speech, Crossman 
appealed to Wilson to censure the Postmaster-General (Crossman, 1977, III, 228-234; Benn, 1988, 
107-113). Crossman suspected Wilson of sympathising with or even authorising Benn’s speech. 
Wilson may also have been concerned with a very critical, but unreported speech which Anthony 
Crosland (President of the Board of Trade) had made at a fringe meeting at the party’s Blackpool 
conference three weeks before (Jefferys, 1999, 135-6). 
 Wilson appears to have composed the minute himself, probably by dictating onto tape. It was 
written and despatched very quickly with few drafts; his private office had limited time to polish 
the prose. 
 Some background shows how intriguing the minute was. Most prime ministers dealt privately 
with errant ministers, rather than issuing a generally circulated minute: neither Benn nor Crosland 
was summoned for a dressing-down, although many premiers have sacked ministers for less. These 
two offenders survived Wilson’s October reshuffle and were allowed the limelight of major 
legislation in 1969. 
 Moreover, as ‘private enterprise forays’ went in this administration, Benn’s and Crosland’s 
speeches were mild. In 1966-7, Wilson had relaxed whipping discipline over the backbenches, with 
predictably damaging results (Short, 1989). Wilson’s ‘crown princes’ – George Brown (former 
Economic Affairs and then Foreign Secretary, now out of government), James Callaghan (Home 
Secretary), Roy Jenkins (Chancellor of the Exchequer) – went on leaking, kite-flying and briefing 
against their colleagues after the minute was issued; so did Crossman. In 1969, Callaghan showed 
even greater public disloyalty Benn or Crosland, without eliciting a similar minute. 
 The minute’s performative, illocutionary work combined blame of persons unnamed, reproof 
for falling standards and admonition to better behaviour. On its face, its rhetoric appealed to 
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collectivity and loyalty and to assert the authority of the prime minister’s office. In passages not 
quoted above, it described clearance procedures. But the language of hierarchical ordering was 
only borrowed. The informal context of ministerial organisation reminds us that much more was 
going on: discourse analysis of the text would miss the institutional dynamics. Wilson was not 
standing above the individualistic organisation of the cabinet to call it back to some lost hierarchical 
ordering, but engaging in operations as redolent of individualistic ordering as his ministers’ 
freelance ‘philosophising’. He was asserting his pre-eminence as a patron in an ordering of rival 
patrons. In reminding ministers of his efforts to cover for them in the Commons and the press, 
he underlined the individualistic ‘general exchange’ underpinning their relations, even as they 
fought out their rivalries. 
 Turning to the written interaction order, the minute displays more than hierarchical 
vocabularies of collectivity, clearance and authorisation. Ironic phrases about ‘philosophising’, 
‘thinking aloud’, being ‘schizophrenic’, ‘kite flying’ and ‘private enterprise’ are the language of 
individualistic rivalry, competitive belittling and self-assertion. None could have come from the 
pen of Burke Trend, Cabinet Secretary and guardian during the 1960s of the true meaning of 
injunctions and phrases in ‘Questions of Procedure for Ministers’. 
 Choosing the weak instrument of a minute circulated to all ministers rather than individual 
dressings-down reflected his judgement of how much further he could push his fissiparous 
colleagues. Individualistic ordering borrowed rhetoric from hierarchical written ritual interaction 
order, but not its accountabilities. Wilson hoped that, together with the weak announcement of 
Hart’s role, and the minute’s unprecedented tone would signal enough toughness to indicate his 
continued determination but not so much as to break his fragile internal coalition. 
 Benn’s and Crossman’s diaries show that they read accurately the minute’s tone, the choice of 
the politically weak Hart as speech-checker and the absence of individual dressings-down or a 
further reshuffle. They appreciated that they betokened no significant change in, but careful 
maintenance of the balance of individualistically ordered power within government. 
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Face-to-face ritual interaction order: accusation, assertion and warning practices 
The following year’s deep crisis in the administration’s institutional ordering shows that the 
October minute failed in its express purpose. Yet it failed in a way that reinforced the highly 
individualistic ritual interaction order from which it sprang, by promoting positive feedback and 
ferociously competitive collective effervescence in recrimination. By June 1969, ministers’ growing 
willingness to use the same blame practices, individual assertion and confrontational language that 
Wilson had done in October 1968, rocked his premiership. The battles over the In place of strife 
proposals for trades union law reform and, most controversially, to give ministers powers to order 
postponement of unofficial strikes for negotiations, to require ballots before official strikes and to 
impose settlements in inter-union disputes, are well documented (e.g., Jenkins, 1970; Tyler, 2006). 
Here, attention is given only to the way in which the face-to-face ritual interaction order through 
which conflict was conducted within the cabinet shaped the written interaction order. 
 An extraordinary confrontation occurred in full cabinet on 8th May 1969, after Callaghan had 
voted at the Party’s National Executive Committee (NEC) for a motion condemning Castle’s 
trades union law reform proposals, and Douglas Houghton (chair of the Parliamentary Labour 
Party) had mobilised the backbenches against the plan (PREM 13/2725. 7.5.69). In cabinet, 
Callaghan told Wilson brutally that the administration could not get a majority for a bill. This kind 
of overt pessimism is always a sensitive anomaly in individualistic institutions, because the ordering 
is sustained by exchanges based on optimistic expectations of material betterment as a result of 
strategic action. Here is Crossman’s (1977, III, 480) account of the face-to-face ritual of 
confrontation: 
 
‘I finally got irritated with Callaghan and said, ‘But look, we are not facing up to the real 
issue, which is that Douglas Houghton has lined himself up with people who are trying to 
get rid of the Prime Minister... He is prepared to see the Prime Minister go because he 
hopes to get another Prime Minister who will drop the Bill... [T]his is totally unrealistic and 
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it would not be credible unless was believed that there was somebody in the Cabinet who 
held the same view. I know and you know that Roy Jenkins and Barbara Castle are as 
deeply committed as the Prime Minister and there is no sense in suggesting that the Prime 
Minister could be got rid of. I detest these rats who are leaving our sinking ship to climb 
onto another sinking ship. We have got to sink or swim together.’ At this point Callaghan 
said from the other side of the table, ‘Not sink or swim, sink or sink,’ and I said, ‘Why can’t 
you resign if you think like that? Get out, Jim, get out.’ We had never had such a scene in 
Cabinet before (I was told later on that it was a phenomenally dramatic moment) and there 
was an awkward silence. Then Jim muttered, ‘Of course, if my colleagues want me to resign 
I’m prepared to go if they insist on my going.’ He had been punctured. He hadn’t 
responded, he crawled and it was quite a moment.’ 
 
 For once, Castle’s (1984, 647) account confirms much of Crossman’s. She added the ending: 
‘We all sat electrified till Harold intervened soothingly, ‘We don’t want you to go. We think you 
should stay and be convinced.’ Nonetheless I could see he was secretly delighted.’ 
 Revealingly, Crossman framed the issue not in ideological terms, but as a matter of individual 
power and challenge, and in emotional exhilaration of collective effervescence in its individualistic 
register. (In the debate about the In place of strife proposals, ideology provided at most a common 
background: Castle and Wilson disagreed with Crossman and other ministers not about the 
principle of state involvement in industrial relations, settled by the 1967 Donovan Commission, 
but how Labour could extend it without ruining relations with the union movement.) Importantly 
for understanding the nature of an interaction order in which such a confrontation can occur, but 
be talked down so that business can continue, Castle reports that Callaghan presented his report 
on the next item, Northern Ireland, ‘unperturbed’: despite the bitter confrontation, cohesion was 
maintained, albeit with difficulty. 
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 Benn’s (1988, 166) account of the meeting is superficially very different. He claims that the 
main confrontation was between himself and Wilson. Yet his version also personalises the 
challenge, turning a policy issue into one of individual leadership and rivalry. Significantly, Benn 
reports himself taking the opportunity to raise with Wilson his frustration with such aspects of the 
face-to-face ritual interaction order as use of ministerial titles in cabinet, which he found too 
redolent of hierarchy. Benn reports his intervention in the same sentence as he claims a personal 
achievement in besting Wilson (‘I knocked Harold for six’). 
 The diaries show that this Cabinet meeting represents just one peak in a trajectory toward 
increasingly heavy individualistic ordering, marked by clashes among the principal figures which 
occasionally erupted into rancour, confrontation and blame. Nothing comparable can be found in 
the inside accounts we possess of the Churchill, Eden, Macmillan, Douglas-Home or Heath 
cabinets (which also included many strong personalities). 
 After this meeting, backbench support for Castle’s proposed legislation including its ‘penal 
clauses’, withered further. The trades union leadership refused to accept them. Cabinet ministers 
realised that the bill would not pass and even if it did, the confrontation with the unions might 
break the administration. Gambling on voters’ continuing concern about unofficial strikes, Wilson 
decided himself to lead the talks with the Trades Union Congress (TUC), so increasing his own 
vulnerability. His so-called ‘inner cabinet’, the ‘Management Committee’, (from which Callaghan 
had been excluded, but not sacked as Home Secretary, after his vote at the NEC) met several times 
each week during June’s intensive negotiations with the TUC.  
 Moreover, unprecedentedly, the trajectory in the face-to-face interaction order spilled into the 
written ritual interaction order. Michael Halls, Wilson’s principal private secretary, developed a 
genre of blow-by-blow reporting to capture the emotional timbre of the face-to-face ritual 
interaction order. Most cabinet committee minutes, even during disagreements, are written in 
sparse, impersonal prose and points are not attributed to individual ministers. By contrast, the June 
1969 Management Committee minutes, although not quite ver
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minister’s contribution and use emotionally highly charged vocabulary to capture the ferocious 
clashes among individual ministers. No cabinet committee minutes from Macmillan’s, Home’s or 
Heath’s administrations present comparably rancorous exchanges in so raw a style; memoirs and 
secondary studies show greater collegiality or at least resigned acceptance of authority in those 
administrations. 
 These minutes show that even with Callaghan and other irreconcilables absent, confrontation 
and very blunt warnings were becoming normal. Here we examine 17th June, the day before Wilson 
and Castle settled for the TUC’s figleaf ‘solemn and binding undertaking’ to discipline member 
unions into resolving unofficial strikes. Crossman, now turning against the bill, is reported as 
warning Wilson against committing the Cabinet to legislation before the necessary soundings had 
been made of the T.U.C. and of the Parliamentary Labour Party’ (PREM 13/2728. 17.6.69). He 
went on bluntly to warn that the TUC would reject the latest proposal outright. Describing bitter 
backbench opposition, Mellish, the Chief Whip, warned the prime minister about backbench 
discontent before his colleagues in a manner that in most administrations would have been 
reserved for private conversation. If, he said, the TUC rejected it, ‘the government would not get 
the Bill through either by using the guillotine [a timetable control motion – P6] or by sending it 
‘upstairs’ [to the House of Lords – P6]’. Wilson retorted by accusing Mellish of defeatism (as 
Crossman had accused Callaghan): ‘The logic’, Wilson is reported as arguing, ‘of [Mellish’s] 
argument now was that Government should always give in against pressure from the Party and the 
unions. This was in effect saying that T.U.C. should govern which would totally destroy the 
credibility of the government.’ Crossman then launched a diatribe. He is minuted as ‘desperately 
disappointed’ in the government’s rejection of the TUC proposal, and warning that the party would 
be ‘bewildered’ at the sight of a Labour government that ‘decided to pick a quarrel with the T.U.C.’ 
and then describe the TUC’s plan as a forced concession, He concluded by warning, in a tone 
reminiscent of the very thing of which he had accused Callaghan in cabinet the previous month, 
that the administration faced ‘disintegration or something worse’. The minutes put this last phrase 
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in direct speech, contrary to most Cabinet Office conventions of drafting minutes. Castle 
remonstrated with Crossman that if he had ‘had his way earlier the Government would have 
achieved nothing. She and the Prime Minister were not ‘hell bent’ [verbatim in original] on 
destroying the Party’, as, presumably, Crossman had accused Castle.  
 This meeting was as nothing to the ferocity of the cabinet meeting which followed immediately 
afterward, as described by Crossman’s, Castle’s and Benn’s diaries and Jenkins’ memoirs. The 
diarists report Peter Shore’s dramatic defection from supporting the bill and Callaghan being 
‘smooth’ (Castle, 1984, 673) and even ‘oily’ (Crossman, 1977, 521). Between cabinet meetings, 
Jenkins finally and regretfully abandoned the Bill’s cause, recognising that his individual political 
interests now required him to distance himself: he Jenkins (1991, 272) described Castle receiving 
his news ‘like St. Sebastian receiving another arrow’. At the second cabinet meeting of that day, 
Wilson, in Crossman’s (1977, 523) account, rounded on his ministers, calling them ‘soft... 
cowardly... lily-livered’, and by turns demanding a decision and refusing one offered by Callaghan. 
Wilson, asserting the core dimensions of individualistic organisation as weakly integrated and 
regulated, insisted ‘Barbara and I must not be tied down. We must be free to negotiate...’ Crossman 
then reports himself having ‘the most searing, awful, bloody row I have ever had with Harold’. 
Crossman reproached Wilson for his abuse of his ministers and attribution of motives and for 
‘wrecking and destroying the movement’ (Crossman, 1977, 524). Whether he said or merely wanted 
to have said these things, we cannot be sure, because neither Castle nor Benn report them, but all 
accounts report embittered face-to-face confrontation. Yet Benn (1988, 187) identified the 
individualistic character of the disagreements when writing of the cabinet on 17th that it was about 
‘a problem of face’. He describes Castle and Wilson as ‘extremely bitter’, and Wilson’s threatened 
resignation as a bluff. Crossman’s account has the prime minister expressing personal spite against 
his disloyal ministers. 
 Again, no meetings of comparable emotional tenor can be found in the accounts of the 
altogether more strongly regulated and integrated administrations led by Macmillan, Home and 
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Heath. Yet in Wilson’s administration, 17th June was no aberration. Rather, the enactment of brutal 
ritualised blame, reproach in deeply individualised, competitive collective effervescence, 
culminated from five years of rivalries, mistrust and manoeuvring between Wilson, his crown 
princes and their claques. Since 1966-7, even Wilson’s clients increasingly sought autonomy from 
him. The face-to-face interaction order enacted the institutional ordering and elicited innovation 
in the written order; practices of blame, reproach, reproof and threat coalesced into a highly 
ritualised standoff. The meeting’s emotional tenor exemplifies well the collective effervescence 
characteristic of an individualistic register rather than the enclaved register typically examined. 
 By June 1969, positive feedback had gone sufficiently far in individualistic ordering to have 
led to disorganisation, just as in the 1970s positive feedback in enclaving among British socialists 
and pro-European social democrats almost split the party. Yet the principal point about the crisis 
of 17th June 1969 was that, the next day, a deal was agreed with the TUC using a figleaf formula, 
Wilson negotiated determinedly to save his face and his threatened premiership; key barons such 
as Callaghan and Jenkins and Crossman accepted it; conflict within cabinet subsided; no minister 
was sacked and none resigned. Informal organisation did not collapse: rivalries continued, but the 
administration recovered. The following year, the administration went into the election confidently 
and lost only narrowly. Wilson survived as leader and become prime minister again in 1974. 
Practices of blame, confrontation and threat in fact sustained individualistic organisation, rather 
than undermining it. Nor were they simply vents or discharges, while the real business was 
conducted more coolly. Rather, these negative rites were the means of conducting the real business: 
had bilateral conversations been crucial, the diarists would have described them, because 
Crossman, Castle and Benn all did so when private talk was consequential. The drama enacted the 
institutions, and made continued organisation possible. For the positive rites and deal-making 
capabilities that Wilson sustained in talks with the TUC throughout May and June 1969’s were the 
converse within individualistic ordering of the negative rites his cabinet enacted and by which 
conflicts were both conducted and contained. Framing work within administration as 
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individualistic, sustained capabilities to do the same with the trades unions. On the surface, the 
negative rites conducted conflict. But when understood in their full informal institutional setting, 
written minute and face-to-face accusation, bluff and confrontation reflected a strategy of 
containing conflict and sustaining individualistic organisation without breakdown. The 
individualistically ordered practices, in these two interaction orders, fixed categories about relations 
within the Labour movement, about political cohesion and about prime ministerial prestige in a 
competitive patronage order, and a process by which offsetting forces were negotiated within the 
cabinet and with the trades unions. 
 
Conclusion 
Understanding how practices work to sustain cohesion through conflict in government requires 
distinguishing elementary from empirical institutions. In positive feedback dynamics within and 
negative feedback processes among elementary forms, ritual performance of operational practices 
in both negative and positive rites shapes capacity for cohesion by cultivating thought style. It does 
so by cultivating collective effervescence, but in competitive and self-aggrandising ways in 
individualistic institutions unlike the communal bonding emotions it sustains in enclaves. 
Differences in emotional timbre of blame and recrimination practices reflect this. In executive 
government, ritual interaction order theory must be extended from face-to-face settings to written 
communication and to their interaction. The implicit agenda of the written ritual order, too, enacts 
social organisation to attenuate emotion and fix categories. In governing, written ritual is as 
fundamental as face-to-face performance: each interaction order depends on, spills over into and 
shapes the other. Thus, the article presents fresh micro-foundations for the causal process by 
which informal institutions shape judgement and cohesion. 
 The neo-Durkheimian institutional approach argues that institutionalised ritual practices stylise 
judgement, developing some capabilities for cohesion while causing others to atrophy. In 
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individualistic organisation, categories are cultivated of individual responsibility and liability, deal-
making, individual prestige, and of transactional confrontations and accommodation as episodes 
in larger clusters of relationships. Capabilities of individual assertion and of ritualised 
confrontation are cultivated in individualistic ordering, but it also cultivates practices of talking 
down crises and of finding ways to paper over confrontation to sustain cooperative organisation. 
Pointing simply to preferences and constraints or to individual personalities cannot explain the 
trajectory of endangered and recovered cohesion. 
 Policymaking is a ritual process. The anthropologist Victor Turner (1974) argued that ritual 
practices can only be understood in their sequence in more or less institutionalised narrative 
structures: Figures 1 and 2 display the causal structure underpinning the narrative. Turner’s studies 
examined sequences where outbreaks of enclaved effervescent organisation were reintegrated in 
hierarchical ordering, showing that confrontation did not merely vent frustrations, but sustained 
collective capabilities. After confrontation, new forms of learning, judgement and collaboration, 
albeit biased and offset by unlearning, were made possible. This article shows that the same is true 
in individualistic ordering. Practices of blame, confrontation and reproof in competitive 
individualistic ordering can generate positive feedback, even to the brink of disorganisation. Yet, 
when that dynamic is not pushed so far, these negative rites can elicit positive rites of deal-making 
and thereby cultivate capabilities for mutual adjustment, deal-making and collaboration as people 
learn about the limits of others’ tolerances for regulation and integration within the prevailing 
ordering. The same could be shown for practices in mixes which show greater articulation of 
isolate, enclaved and hierarchical ordering. Thereby, in these elementary forms of ritual interaction 
order, operational practices sustain distinct kinds of cohesion and capabilities in governing. 
 
  27 
References 
6 P, 2003a, Institutional viability: a neo-Durkheimian theory, Innovation: the European journal of social 
science research, 16, 4, 395-415. 
6 P, 2003b, What is there to feel? a neo-Durkheimian theory of the emotions, European journal of 
psychotherapy, counselling and health, 5, 3, 263-290. 
6 P, 2007, Rituals elicit emotions to define and shape public life: a neo-Durkheimian theory, in 6 
P, Squire C, Treacher A and Radstone S, eds, 2007, Public emotions, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 37-61. 
6 P, 2011, Explaining political judgement, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
6 P, 2014a, Explaining decision-making in government: the neo-Durkheimian institutional 
framework, Public administration, 92, 1, 87-103. 
6 P, 2014b, Elementary forms and their dynamics: revisiting Mary Douglas, Anthropological forum, 
24, 3, 287-307. 
6 P, 2015a, If governance is everything, maybe it’s nothing, in Massey A and Miller K, eds, 2015, 
The international handbook of public administration and governance, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 56-80. 
6 P, 2015b, Explaining styles of political judgement in British government: comparing isolation 
dynamics between administrations (1959-74), Journal of public policy, 
doi:10.1017/S0143814X15000100. 
6 P, in press, Opportunistic decision-making in government: concept formation, variety and 
explanation, International review of administrative sciences. 
Alexander J, ed, 1988, Durkheimian sociology: cultural studies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Arthur WB, 1994, Increasing returns and path dependence in the economy, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University 
of Michigan Press. 
Austin JL, 1962, How to do things with words, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Baker A, 2000, Prime ministers and the rule book, London: Politico’s. 
  28 
Bale T, 1999, Sacred cows and common sense: the symbolic statecraft and political culture of the British Labour 
Party, Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Bell C, 1997, Ritual: perspectives and dimensions, New York: Oxford. 
Benn T, 1988, Office without power: diaries 1968-72, London: Arrow. 
Bennett A and Checkel JT, eds, 2015, Process tracing: from metaphor to analytic tool, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bourdieu P, 1990, The logic of practice, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Bowie R, 2001, Informed judgment: Eisenhower’s system for effective policy making, in Lobel A, 
ed, 2001, Presidential judgement: foreign policy decision-making in the white House, Hollis, New Hampshire: 
Hollis, 5-20. 
Calvert R, 1998, Rational actors, equilibrium and social institutions, in Knight J and Sened I, eds, 
1998, Explaining social institutions, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 57-94. 
Castle B, 1984, The Castle diaries 1964-70, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson. 
Collins R, 2004, Interaction ritual chains, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Crewe E, 2005, Lords of parliament: manner, rituals and politics, Manchester: University of Manchester 
Press. 
Crossman RHS, 1977, The diaries of a cabinet minister, vol III: Secretary of State for Social services 1968-
1970, London: Hamish Hamilton and John Cape. 
Deutsch KW, 1963, The nerves of government: models of political communication and control, New York: Free 
Press. 
Douglas M, ed, 1970, Witchcraft confessions and accusations, London: Tavistock. 
Douglas M, 1982, Cultural bias, in Douglas M, 1982, In the active voice, London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 193-254. 
Douglas M, 1986, How institutions think, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Douglas M, 1992, Risk and blame: essays in cultural theory, London: Routledge. 
  29 
Douglas M, 1999, Sorcery accusations unleashed, in Douglas M, 1999, Implicit meanings: selected essays 
in anthropology, 2nd edn, London: Routledge, 77-94. 
Durkheim É, 1951, Suicide: a study in sociology, London: Routledge. 
Durkheim É, 1957, Professional ethics and civic morals, tr Brookfield C, London: Routledge. 
Durkheim É, 1995, Elementary forms of religious life, tr Fields K, New York: Free Press. 
Durkheim É and Mauss M, 1963, Primitive classification, tr Needham R, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Farrell H and Héritier A, 2003, Formal and informal institutions under codecision: continuous 
constitution building in Europe, Governance, 16, 4, 577-600. 
Garfinkel H, 1967, Studies in ethnomethodology, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 
Goffman E, 1959, The presentation of self in everyday life, Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Goffman E, 1961, Asylums: essays on the social situation of mental patients and other inmates, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Goffman E, 1967, Interaction ritual: essays on face-to-face behaviour, New York: Pantheon. 
Gross JL and Rayner S, 1985, Measuring culture: a paradigm for the analysis of social organisation, New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Haney PJ, 1997, Organising for foreign policy crises: presidents, advisers and the management of decision making, 
Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press. 
Heclo H and Wildavsky A, 1981, The private government of public money: community and policy inside British 
politics, London: Macmillan. 
Helmke G and Levitsky S, eds, 2006, Informal institutions and democracy: lessons from Latin America, 
Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University. 
Hood CC, 1998, The art of the state: culture, rhetoric and public management, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Hood CC, 2011, The blame game: spin, bureaucracy and self-preservation in government, Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
  30 
Jenkins P, 1970, The battle of Downing Street, London: Charles Knight. 
Jenkins R, 1991, A life at the centre, London: Macmillan. 
Jefferys K, 1999, Anthony Crosland, London: Politico’s [Richard Cohen]. 
Kertzer DI, 1988, Ritual, politics and power, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. 
Levitsky S, 1998, Institutionalisation and Peronism: the case, the concept and the case for 
unpacking the concept, Party politics, 4, 1, 77-92. 
Lowndes V and Roberts M, 2013 Why institutions matter: the new institutionalism in political science, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
March JG and Olsen J-P, 1989, Rediscovering institutions: the organisational basis of politics, New York: 
Free Press. 
North DC, 1990, Institutions, institutional change and economic performance, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Olaveson T, 2001, Collective effervescence and communitas: processual models of ritual and 
society in Émile Durkheim and Victor Turner, Dialectical anthropology, 26, 1, 89-124. 
Ostrom E, 1990, Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Peck EW, 6 P, Gulliver P and Towell D, 2004, Why do we keep meeting like this? The board as 
ritual in health and social care, Health services management research, 17, 100-109. 
Pierson P, 2004, Politics in time: history, institutions and social analysis, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press. 
Rayner S, 1988, The rules that keep us equal: complexity and the costs of egalitarian organisation, 
in Flanagan JG and Rayner S, eds, 1988, Rules, decisions and inequality in egalitarian societies, Aldershot: 
Avebury, 20-42. 
Rhodes RAW, 2011, Everyday life in British government, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Romm (Livermore) CT, 1999, Virtual politicking: playing politics in electronically linked organisations, 
Cresskill, New Jersey: Hampton Press. 
  31 
Rothenbuhler EW, 1998, Ritual communication: from everyday conversation to mediated ceremony, Thousand 
Oaks, California: Sage. 
Sahlins M, 1995, How ‘natives’ think: about Captain Cook, for example, Chicago, Illinois: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Schatzki T, 1996, Social practices: a Wittgensteinian approach to human activity and the social, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Shove E, Panzar M and Watson M, 2012, The dynamics of social practice: everyday life and how it changes, 
London: Sage. 
Schwartzman HB, 1989, The meeting: gatherings in organisations and communities, New York: Plenum. 
Searle J, 1969, Speech acts: an essay in the philosophy of language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Shilling C and Mellor PA, 1998, Durkheim, morality and modernity: collective effervescence, 
homo duplex and the sources of moral action, British journal of sociology, 49, 2, 193-209. 
Short E, 1989, Whip to Wilson: the crucial years of Labour government, London: MacDonald. 
Thompson M, Ellis RJ and Wildavsky A, 1990, Cultural theory, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 
Thornton P, Ocasio W and Lounsbury M, 2012, The institutional logics perspective: a new approach to 
culture, structure and process, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Turner V, 1974, Dramas, fields and metaphors: symbolic action in human society, Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press. 
Turner V, 1995, The ritual process: structure and anti-structure, Hawthorne, New York: Aldine de 
Gruyter. 
Tyler R, 2006, ‘Victims of our history’: Barbara Castle and In place of strife, Contemporary British history, 
20, 3, 461-476. 
Wildavsky A, 1994, Why self-interest means less outside of a social context: cultural contributions 
to a theory of rational choices, Journal of theoretical politics, 6, 2, 131-159. 




























weighted mix of four 
basic styles 














More intense form 











distinct style of 
collective effervescence 
Alternatively, countervailing 
pressure, e.g., assertion of 
alternative ordering such as 
hierarchy or isolate ordering 
Stabilisation from within the 
ordering e.g., individualistic 
deal-making, or pre-
eminence of one patron 
Gives rise to internal 
institutional settlement or 
negative feedback, in either 











































feedback in styles 
of collective 
effervescence 
Innovation in genre 
to respond, reflect, 
absorb emotional 
energy in ritual 
interaction order 
Innovation in speech 
style and illocutionary 
force to ensure 
institutionally 
imperatives outcomes 
in subsequent written 
communication 
Positive 
feedback in styles 
of collective 
effervescence 
Figure 2: Cross-influence of face to face and written ritual interaction orders in government – 
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